英文内容提要

ABSTRACTS

01 The Public Opinion War between China and the United Statesand China’s International Communication,by Dr. Zhang Wenzong,Deputy Director and Associate Research Professor at Institute of American Studies, CICIR; and Dr. Hu Pan, Lecturer at School of Overseas Education,Sichuan University. Regarding China as the primary strategic competitor,the U.S. government has gone all out to contain and suppress China, thus provoking strong opposition from China, and making public opinion warfare an important part of the game between China and the United States. The public opinion war between China and the U.S. covers a wide range of issues and has a global impact, which has evolved to the point of ideological confrontation and mutual expulsion of media practitioners.The offensive of public opinion on both sides is closely related to the characteristics of their respective political systems and social forms, while the initial achievements match the existing international influence of China and the United States. Although the public opinion war waged by the U.S.against China has damaged China’s image in Western developed countries to some extent, it has greatly consolidated cohesion among the Chinese people and boosted morale at home. In the days to come, the U.S. is likely to do what it did to the Soviet Union and Russia on China, combining the public opinion warfare more with the psychological and political warfare against China.

16 Clea n Energy Supply Chain and the Biden Administration’sReshaping Strategy: From a Geopolitical Perspective,by Zhang Rui, Senior Research Fellow at Economic and Technological Research Institute, GEIDCO; and Hong Tao, Senior Research Fellow at Energy Policy Research Section of the Institute of Energy and Environmental Policy Studies, Development Research Center of the State Council. In the age of accelerated energy transformation, the Biden administration has focused on reshaping the supply chain for photovoltaic and lithium batteries, mainly motivated by America’s relative weakness in this regard,its concerns about energy security, limited effects of trade barriers, and impacts wrought by the COVID-19 pandemic, which involves such strategic directions as industrial localization focusing on technological innovation, politicization of cracking down on Chinese industries on the ground of human rights, alignment of allies to strengthen governance, and diversification of the supply of key mineral resources. The U.S. strategy to reshape clean energy supply chain is highly an outward one, focusing on external effects more than supporting domestic industries, which will make international energy development and technological cooperation more sensitive, accelerate the formation of a geopolitical order in a carbonneutral age, and increase the weaponization of supply chains. Under such circumstances, the development of China-U.S. relations has to face more difficulties.

38 The Biden Administration’s Cyberspace Policy toward China andChina’s Response,by Ling Shengli, Director at Center for International Security Studies, China Foreign Affairs University. Since taking office,the Biden administration remains tough on China in cyberspace in order to maintain the technological edge of the United States and control its rule-making power in the field of cyberspace. The specific measures of the Bidenadministration’s cyberspace policy toward China involve five aspects, such as enhancing technological capabilities, strengthening supply chain security, hyping up Chinese cyber threats, strengthening alliance,and formulating international cyber rules, which are mainly based on four considerations, namely taking China as the strongest competitor,stressing cyber security, repairing alliance relations through cooperation in cyberspace, and attaching importance to the leadership of the international system toseek the power of writing international rules in cyberspace.The implementation of such a cyberspace policy toward China by the Biden administration will not only increase the risk of “technological decoupling” between China and the United States, but also make it difficult to ease thestrategic competition between the two countries, thus making it harder forU.S. allies to make strategic choices in cyberspace, and further still affecting global cyberspace governance.

58 The Biden Administration’s Policy toward Southeast Asia:Momentum, Motivation and Challenges,by Dr. Luo Yongkun, Deputy Director and Associate Research Professor at Institute of Southeast Asian and Oceanian Studies, CICIR; and Dr. Chen Zinan, Associate Research Professor at Institute of Maritime Strategic Studies, CICIR. Since the beginning of the Biden administration, the United States has attached great importance to Southeast Asia and gradually increased strategic input to the region, with a focus on diplomatic, economic and military dimensions,in a bid to expand and deepen cooperation with Southeast Asian countries. Relevant policy measures reflect the new trend of the Biden administration’s Southeast Asia policy, namely focusing on “whole-ofgovernment” competition with China, enhancing U.S. strategic influence over Southeast Asian countries, and strengthening strategic reshaping of regional mechanisms such as ASEAN to include the region in the core area of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. Despite the Biden administration’s aggressive diplomacy toward Southeast Asia, it is less likely that Southeast Asian countries will fall into the U.S. camp due to the aggravating political polarization in the U.S., limited US foreign aid funds, the deepening economic dependence of ASEAN countries on China, and their cautious attitude of “not to take sides”

80 Digital Governance in the EU: Concept, Practice and Impact,by Xue Yan, Doctoral Student at Institute of Communication Studies,Communication University of China (CUC); and Zhao Ke, Deputy Director and Associate Research Fellow at Russian and European Research Section of the Institute for International Strategic Studies, Party School of the Central Committee of CPC (Chinese Academy of Governance). In the context of increasingly fierce global competition in science and technology,the EU has accelerated digital transformation in recent years and put forward the strategic concept of “digital sovereignty”, which has aroused strong repercussion around the world. The EU has made continuous efforts to regulate the development direction of the digital market and introduced a series of new regulatory regulations, thus becoming the maker,contributor and leader of global digital governance rules. Relying on its huge digital economic market and advanced technology basis, the EU has introduced the concept of digital governance to the world, whose impacts are worth noting: the “European color” in global digital governance rulemaking is getting increasingly prominent; the power of the integrated EU digital market to shape the landscape of global digital economy is getting stronger; and “consumer sovereignty” is becoming a new feature of global digital governance.

103 The Fumio Kishida Cabinet after Election: Governing Basis andPolicy Orientation,by Xu Wansheng, Professor and Doctoral Supervisor at Information Engineering University; and Zhang Yuxin, Graduate Student at Information Engineering University. The birth of the Fumio Kishida Cabinet in Japan is the result of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s(LDP) “last-minute change of leadership” before the general election.The ruling coalition took advantage of voters’ “policy expectations” for the new cabinet, as well as the subsiding of the COVID-19 pandemic in the country, the weakness of the opposition parties, and careful campaign strategies to win the general election. Although the ruling basis of Kishida’s cabinet has stabilized for the time being after the general election, it still faces many severe challenges in power transfer, policy adjustment and national elections. As a result, its political stability is not optimistic and it has great difficulties to achieve long-term governance.The Fumio Kishida Cabinet has proposed to build “constructive and stable China-Japan relations” and pursue a realistic foreign policy toward China,but its foreign policy orientation will keep the obvious inertia of targeting at China, and its policies such as ensuring economic security and “human rights diplomacy” may increase the chances of friction in China-Japan relations.

121 The Alignment of the New Land-Sea Corridor with the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation in the Context of “Dual Circulation”,by Ren Keyao, Lecturer at Changshu Polytechnics, and Senior Research Fellow at Research Center for Laos-GMR Sub-region Countries of Universities in Jiangsu; and Zhai Kun, Professor at School of International Relations and Deputy Director of Institute for Country and Area Studies, Peking University, and Vice President of China Association of Southeast Asian Studies. The alignment of the new land-sea corridor with the Lancang-Mekong cooperation is a possible point of breakthrough in promoting the formation of a new “dual circulation” development pattern. The new land-sea corridor, as an international mechanism, has a good foundation to match with the Lancang-Mekong cooperation and is easy to connect.However, in the process of connection, there are still challenges such as poor regional connectivity, overlapping and inefficient cooperation mechanisms, increasingly fierce game among major countries, and doubts among member states and ASEAN about China’s expansion of influence.Therefore, we must promote the efficient alignment and synergetic efficiency of the new land-sea corridor with the Lancang-Mekong cooperation through such ways as strengthening the construction of connectivity, increasing cooperation with other international mechanisms,and carrying out cooperation in third markets. Only in such a way, can we promote the new development paradigm of “dual circulation” to make breakthroughs in China’s southwest direction, and achieve interactive development with countries in the Indo-China Peninsula and of ASEAN.