Journal of Japanese Invasion of China and Nanjing Massacre

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(4)

During the Nanjing Massacre, more than 20 westerners who stayed in Nanjing played a great role in protecting and rescuing refugees by virtue of being citizens of neutral states. There were also a large number of Chinese staff fighting side by side with these westerners, over 1500 at its peak, including Chinese members of various special committees under the International Committee of Nanjing Safety Zone, administrative staff of refugee shelters, and collaborative organizations at the grassroots-level under the International Committee. They risked their lives, participated in refugee relief without remuneration and hesitation, and took on lots of specific and tedious work. Like the westerners who stayed in Nanjing during the massacre, these Chinese staff were heroes, too.

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Sacrifice is the core topic of novels about the Nanjing Massacre. The way Chinese and foreign writers narrate sacrifice reflects the ideological control of their respective countries and the evolution of the concept of life and death, including constructive sacrifice, the virtuous sacrifice of loyalty to the emperor, the sacrifice of charity and salvation. The massacre narratives of Chinese writers focus on strengthening national identity and the belief in victory, which constitutes a response to the sacrificial theory of national subjugation. From the perspective of foreign writers, the joint commitment of the Chinese nation to the disaster is often relegated to an internal conflict of military-civilian confrontation and gender rivalries, which in turn serves to gloss over the Japanese army and spread the glory of foreigners. Based on a transnational and cross-cultural perspective, an in-depth analysis of the concept of sacrifice in novels about the Nanjing Massacre can provide value guidance for future literary creation, and provide a positive spiritual orientation for remembering the history and shaping the memory.

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During the total war of resistance against Japan, the Chinese Communists represented by Mao Zedong put forward the theory of neo-democracy. The main feature of the neo-democratic economy is not only to develop the public and collective economy, but also to allow the development of capitalism and private economy. With the guidance of the neo-democratic economic policy, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region constantly adjusted its economic policy according to the changes of situation of the War. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region not only had the resources to establish a self-sufficiency economy, but also established various regulations suitable for the self-sufficiency economy, which promoted the establishment of a self-sufficiency economy system. By the end of 1944, the grain yield in the border area had reached “Three-year farming with One-year Surplus” or “Two-year farming with One-year Surplus”. The self-sufficiency rate of cotton was 85%, and the self-sufficiency rate of cloth was 60%. Most daily necessities could meet the demand, and some products were more than self-sufficient. Therefore, the establishment of a self-sustaining economic system in the border area was the fundamental reason for the border area to survive the difficult period of the War of Resistance, while external trade only played a subsidiary role.

(57)

Since the outbreak of the Southern Anhui Incident, it has attracted the attention of academic circles for a long time; however, the lack of examination and identification of archival documents in some writings has caused many errors in the discourse. Based on the textual research on the dates of the seven telegrams, it is showed that as far as the transfer of the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui is concerned, for a relatively long period of time before the Incident, the differences between Xiang Ying and the Central Committee of the CPC were more reflected in the route and timing of the transfer. Xiang Ying was more inclined to the “eastward-moving to the south of Jiangsu”, while the Central Committee of the CPC was inclined to the “northward-moving to the east of Anhui”. However, both sides had made adjustments due to the influence of the external situations without fundamental antagonism. With the optimism about the current situation, Xiang Ying et al. turned to stick to southern Anhui in mid-October 1940 and failed to thoroughly implement the instructions of the central government. However, when Yan’an decided to abandon southern Anhui and insist on moving northward in early November, Xiang Ying et al. also made adjustments accordingly.

“-”:(1941—1944)

(66)

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, it was an important diplomatic goal of the nationalist government to push the United States to adjust its “Europe-First” strategy. As a tool to advance diplomacy, international propaganda was also carried out around this goal. Throughout the Pacific War, to adapt to changes in the situation, the nationalist government constantly adjusted its international propaganda’s focus and used various methods to carry out external propaganda activities, hoping that the United States would pay more attention to the Chinese battlefield and provide more military support. As a whole, although these efforts failed to change the “Europe-First” strategy formulated by the United States based on its own interests and war situation, and exposed many deficiencies in the international propaganda of the nationalist government, it still had some positive significance in terms of obtaining materials from Lend-Lease Act and publicizing China’s contribution in the Anti-Fascist War to the world.

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As a reactionary feudal organization controlled by the Japanese puppet authorities during the war of aggression against China, the Society for the Promotion of Virtue in the Puppet Manchukuo regarded Wang Fengyi’s theory as its core philosophy, which was based on feudal ethics and elements of traditional Chinese medicine with the so-called “Tao Te Ching” and the Neo-Confucianism as its main content. Wang Fengyi’s theory had a certain internal consistency with the “kingly-way political thought’ of the puppet Manchukuo characterized by Japan’s “Hakko Ichiu” and ancient Chinese feudal ethics. The Society therefore was preserved and expanded during the Japanese war of aggression against China. To shape the cultural identity of the society members to the puppet regime, and to meet the needs of implementing “national spiritual mobilization” in the puppet Manchukuo, Japan took advantage of the influence of Wang Fengyi’s theory among the people in the Northeast and their desire for basic needs to reshape the organizational structure of the Society, and implanted political discourse of “kingly-way political thought” and “war mobilization” into the Society’s propaganda contents for ensuring that the Japanese propaganda and ideological control in Northeast China could reach the most miserable groups at the grassroots level. After the promulgation of the “National General Mobilization Act”, the Society has become an instrument of propaganda for Japan to implement “national spiritual mobilization” in the puppet Manchukuo.

(1928—1932)

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After the split of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China in 1927, the Communist Party of China established the Red Army and embarked on the path of encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing power by arms. From 1928 to 1932, the Japanese Foreign Ministry and its consulates in China carried out extensive investigations towards the Red Army’s structure, military operations, weapons and tactical strategies through multiple intelligence channels. These investigations analyzed the relationship among the Red Army, the Soviet Union and the Communist International, clarified the relationship between the Red Army and the CPC, predicted the development trend of the Red Army, and provided the basis of a series of national polices for Japan to launch its war of aggression against China. Through the above-mentioned investigations, Japan realized that the emergence and development of the Red Army was a realistic need and a historical necessity for the CPC to lead the Chinese revolution.

’(1926—1928)

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After defeating the National Army in 1926, FengXi Warlord took the initiative to distance itself from Japan and contacted the United Kingdom on purpose, hoping to take the development opportunity of road and port to attract British investment in the Northeast to counterbalance Japan. After taking control of the central regime, FengXi Warlord intensified its communication with the United Kingdom, trying to resolve the unequal treaty issue in a moderate way, while exaggerating ideological conflicts in the hope of obtaining more assistance from the UK. FengXi Warlord ’s liaison with the UK strongly angered the young turks of the Japanese army, which regarded the move by FengXi Warlord as an act of “treachery”. Zhang Zuolin was regarded as a “British and American puppet” and became the most hated person. However, the Japanese government and the Kwantung Army’s young turks had deep contradictions regarding how to deal with the Manchuria and Mongolian issue. The Japanese government was just unable to deal with Zhang Zuolin resolvedly as the young turks expected. Stimulated by the internal and external situations, Komoto Daisaku et al. risked the danger in desperation, and staged the Huanggutun Incident with Zhang Zuolin killed in the explosion. The adjustment of FengXi Warlords’ external relations was actually a hidden clue to observe the outbreak of the Huanggutun Incident.

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After launching the total war of aggression against China, to strengthen the propaganda of militarism and the control of public opinion, the Japanese government promulgated the Film Law in 1939 in an attempt to use films to serve the war. The Film Law largely left the implementation of the law to the decision of the administrative organizations, and it was up to the government to lead the structural reorganization of the film industry. By integrating the film companies, unifying the distribution system and the qualification recognition, the Japanese government fundamentally controls the lifeline of the film industry. Meanwhile，the Japanese government also played a leading role in the development of the film industry by the will of the country via forcing the release of cultural film and news picture. With the strong intervention of state power, Japanese films played a key role in publicizing and mobilization, whitewashing the nature of aggression, inciting war fever, advocating “Co-prosperity of East Asia”, promoting the continental colonization and encouraging the Japanese people to be the victims and supporters of the war of aggression. At the same time, the control towards the films was also widely used in the colonial rule of occupied areas in China as a means of cultural aggression. Film became an important tool to advocate “Japan-China Friendship” and promote enslaving education.

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(131)

Japan’s invasion of China caused the Chinese people to experience “no difference” in the state of war. Compared with the obvious information of death, bombing, migration, etc., the wartime people were more in a state of “false-security”. Fear, depression and endless expectations seemed to be the portrayal of most people’s normal life. Chen Kewen was a counselor at the Executive Yuan of the nationalist government, and his diary reflects an academic official’s feelings of war and his complicated mentality in a difficult situation when he was in a government organization while Hao Xingjiu, as a rural teacher, witnessed the destruction of the countryside and the impact of the war on the people’s daily life. As witnesses to the War, the differences in their occupations and their circles provide a relatively comprehensive perspective for people to understand the thinking of wartime individual life. However, the same individual attribute of “intellectuals” made them different from ordinary villagers and politicians, and they were more able to transcend others with their experiences of displacement and hesitation and asked the questions of“Where is the country? Where will the country go?” This worry about the country’s future also invisibly shaped the complexity of their wartime psychology. Listening to both wartime inmost voices, one can have a glimpse of the development trend of Republican China’s historical destiny.